政治选举、管理层风险异质性与股东财富

Political Election,Management Risk Pr efer ence Diver isity and Shar eholder Wealth

本文以中国共产党第十八次代表大会为自然试验田,采用沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验中央领导人权力交接对公司股东财富的影响。结果发现,在政治选举事件[-1,1]、[-5,5]、[-10,10]、[-20,20]、[-30,30]五个时间窗口内,股东财富分别实际蒸发了2.65%、3.96%、7.46%、11%和8%;进一步考察了管理层风险偏好特征在面临不确定性时对公司股东价值的影响,结果表明管理层风险偏好与股东财富之间呈显著负相关关系;此外,根据所有权性质进行分类,实证发现在政治选举事件中,相比国企,非国有企业管理层风险偏好会导致股东财富更大的损失,这意味着市场对选举年中偏好风险的非国有企业的管理层持更加谨慎态度。

Taking the eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of China as a natural experiment, this study has the Shanghai and Shenzhen A listed Corporation as the research sample to test the impact of the power transfer of the central government leaders on the company's shareholders wealth. The empirical results are showed as following. First, in the five event windows of political elections,[-1,1],[-5,5],[-10,10],[-20,20],[-30,30],the stockholders' wealth actually decreases 2.65%,3.96%,7.46%,11%and8%.Second, there is a significant negative relationship between management risk preference and shareholder wealth in the face of uncertainty. In addition, the research makes a classification according to the nature of ownership, finding that, compared to state-owned enterprises, non-state-owned enterprises management risk preferences will lead to greater shareholder wealth losses in the political election events, which means that the market takes a more cautious attitude toward non-state-owned enterprise management who has a risk preference in the election year.