“高薪养廉”还是“高薪致腐”?——基于中国证券市场的经验证据

“High Payment to Restrain Corruption”or“High Salary to Encourage Corruption”:Based on Chinese Securities Market Empirical Evidence

近年来,"反腐败"已经成为中国经济领域中一个非常重要的话题。以中国沪深A股2007—2014年间的1415个上市公司为样本,可实证检验高管薪酬与高管腐败之间存在的关系。研究发现,高管薪酬在高管的显性腐败与隐性腐败之间表现出完全不同的关系。在显性腐败行为中,高管薪酬与腐败行为之间存在显著的负相关关系,即"高薪养廉",也就是说高管获得的薪酬水平越高,则高管显性腐败的概率越低;而在隐性腐败行为中,高管薪酬则与腐败行为之间存在显著的正相关关系,即"高薪致腐",也就是说高管获得的薪酬水平越高,则高管隐性腐败的程度会更高。另外,研究还发现,相较于非国有属性的企业,"高薪养廉"在国有属性的企业中表现得更为明显。

In recent years,＂anti-corruption＂has been an important topic in the field of Chinese economy.This paper empirically examines the relationships between senior executives payment and the probability of their corruption,based on a sample of 1,415 listed companies in Chinas Shanghai and Shenzhen A share markets in 2007—2014.The study found that,different relationships exist between their high payments and overt corruption or hidden corruption.In the aspect of overt corruption,the correlation between payment and corruption is significantly negative,which suggests high payment restrains corruption,or in an other word,the higher the payment,the lower the probability of overt corruption.And in hidden corruption,the correlation is significantly positive,which means high payment encourages corruption,or,the higher the payment,the higher the probability of hidden corruption.The study also found that compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the phenomenon of‘high payment restraining corruption＇is more evident in state-owned enterprises.