产业政策对企业间工资差距的影响--来自中国工业企业的经验证据

The Effect of China Industrial Policy on the Wage Gap between Enterprises:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Industrial Enterprises

中国产业政策的执行对企业间工资差距有何影响?文章首先考虑加入了产业政策因素的异质性企业模型,从理论上将产业政策对企业工资影响分解为补贴转移效应与竞争效应两种机制,并提出如下假说:企业将部分政策补助用于生产,此时支付的更多工资等同于财政的直接补贴;同时,企业工资水平也取决于企业的生产效率,产业政策通过促进或抑制行业竞争改变企业效率,从而对企业的工资水平产生一种间接影响,即竞争效应。使用1998-2007年中国工业规模以上企业数据对理论假说进行实证检验,可以发现:"中国式"产业政策抑制企业效率带来的负向竞争效应超过了正向的补贴转移效应,最终造成了企业工资水平下降;然而,一旦产业政策的施行促进了行业竞争,竞争效应则为正,那么企业的工资水平也会随之提高。文章研究的结论有助于理解经济改革过程中产业政策对企业工资的影响,对推进企业工资体制改革也具有启示意义。

The unbalanced development within the Chinese industries may bring the imbalance of income among different groups.What kind of role does industrial policy play,namely whether the implementation of China industrial policy brings the wage gap between enterprises？ This paper considers subsidies as the breakthrough point,introduces industrial policy factor into a heterogeneous enterprise model,and theoretically decomposes the impact of industrial policy on enterprise wages into two mechanisms,namely subsidy transfer effect and competition effect.And it puts forward the following hypotheses：the enterprises spend part of policy subsidies on production,and now more wages paid are equivalent to direct fiscal subsidies;at the same time,enterprise wage level also depends on enterprise production efficiency,and industrial policy changes enterprise efficiency through promoting or inhibiting industrial competition,thereby having an indirect influence on enterprise wage level,namely competition effect.Next,this paper empirically checks above theoretical hypotheses by using the data of Chinese industrial enterprises above designated size from 1998 to2007.Specifically,the control variables are gradually added,and the variable reflecting subsidy policy has always been a negative relationship with enterprise wage level.After controlling total factor productivity of enterprises,this relationship between subsidy policy and enterprise wage level becomes positive,while the impact of subsidies on total factor productivity of enterprises is negative.Then we can conclude that：negative competition effect resulting from China-style industrial policy through inhibiting enterprise efficiency exceeds positive subsidy transfer effect,finally leading to a reduction in enterprise wage level.This paper further explores the issue of a competition-friendly industrial policy based on Aghion et al.（2015）that shows the dispersion of government industrial policy coverage.Once industrial policy target is more extensive,the competitive effect of policy on enterprise wages will turn positive,and enterprise wage level will increase accordingly.These research conclusions help to understand the impact of industry policy on enterprise wages in the process of economic reform,enrich the related research of enterprise wages,and have enlightenment for deepening the reform：the unreasonable implementation of industrial policy has hindered the reform of basic wage system reform in China,and we can not bring some enterprises＇ revenues to subsidize the other;the fairness of this behavior is questionable,and how to give priority to efficiency as well as equity needs to be weighed carefully and repeatedly by policy formulators.Subsidies for some enterprises can be converted into wage subsidies for skilled workers,which on the one hand,attract talents to enterprises and help enterprises to improve efficiency and on the other hand,avoid the negative effects resulting from direct subsidies for enterprises.