内生官员业绩奖励与外生监管机制对公共物品供给影响的实验研究

T he experimental research of the governance mechanism for the free-rider problem

公共物品具有消费的非竞争性与受益的非排他性,其中非排他性往往会引发难以解决的搭便车问题。设计一组重复实验,探究公共物品搭便车问题的治理机制。实验结果表明:如将公共物品供给程度作为官员政绩考核标准之一,权力执行者会更有意愿加强对公共物品供给的监管。同时,监管的频率对公共物品供给起到显著的正相关影响;监管越频繁,公共物品供给越多。而处罚力度对公共物品供给影响不显著。由权力执行者进行的外部惩罚机制确实能让参与者减少搭便车行为,使得公共物品供给效率增加,从而缓解搭便车问题。该实验结果在环境污染、食品安全等方面具有很重要的指导意义。

Public goods have two properties： the non-exclusive of the benefit and the non-competitive of the consumption.The non-exclusive of the benefit often triggers the free-rider problem. In this paper we designed a set of repeated experiments,exploring the governance mechanism for the free-rider problem. The results of the experiments show that： if we consider the degree of public goods supply as one of evaluation standards for the officials,executives in power will be more willing to strengthen the supervision of the public goods supply. Meanwhile,the regulatory frequency has significant positive correlative effect on the public goods supply,but penalties have no significant effect on the public goods supply. The external punishment mechanism performs by executives in power can actually lead the participants to reduce the free riding behavior,improving the freerider problem. The experimental results provide significant guidance in solving environmental pollution problems,food safety issues,and corruption problems.