中国法律权力的联邦制实践——以劳动合同法领域为例

The Practice of Federalism in Chinese Legal System:An Empirical Study on Labor Contract Law

从中央与地方关系的视角来看,当代中国立法权与司法权的配置与实施的显著特征是,虽然中央的立法权与司法权在法理上具有无可争议的领导地位,但是在实践中,地方的立法权与司法权的重要性并不亚于前者。这种现象可被归纳为"单一制基调+联邦制色彩"的国家结构形式。劳动合同法领域的实践,便较为明显地体现了立法权和司法权在当代中国的此种"联邦制色彩"。以北京、上海和广州这三个城市违纪解除劳动合同纠纷判决书为样本所做的实证研究,从经验层面证实了法律权力联邦制实践的事实影响,即各个地方不同的法律规则会导致对公民/企业权利的差异性保护,在劳动合同法领域的实践中,这具体体现在对劳动者(企业)有利的法律规则会导致对劳动者(企业)有利的司法裁判,并且在统计学意义上这种差别非常显著。

From the perspective of central-local relations,there is an obvious"Chinese characteristics"regarding the de jure allocation of legislative and judicial powers and their de facto practice.That is,while the national legislature and supreme court have an unchallengeably dominating position in the Chinese legal system on books,local practices are no less influential in action.The authors conceptualize this institutional phenomenon as"federalist spectrum in a unitary background"of the Chinese legal system and examine the concept with an empirical study on labor contract law.The empirical study finds that there are enormous local labor contract laws and rules,which are significantly different from or even conflicting with national laws.In particular,regression analysis on 4,175 cases adjudicated by courts in Beijing,Guangzhou,and Shanghai confirms that localities have different positions in protecting employee rights,which is statistically significant.