地方政府行为与城市商业银行风险承担

Local Government Behaviors and the Risk-taking of City Commercial Bank

纯市场环境下商业银行的风险承担是其在盈利与风险控制之间进行平衡的行为。但中国城市商业银行由政策主导建立,地方政府会对其经营决策进行直接干预。此外,城市商业银行大多为本地经营,地方政府的城市治理行为也会对其风险控制造成影响。在政府控制和治理行为框架下研究政府行为是否对城市商业银行风险承担产生负面影响,对于城市商业银行在新常态下实现可持续发展具有一定的现实意义。基于对相关理论的梳理,将城市商业银行的风险细化为信贷风险、贷款投放、流动性风险和偿付风险4类,以分析政府行为对其的影响。考虑到4种风险存在着一定的内生相关性,采用似不相关回归方法建立方程组进行估计。以2007年至2013年中国45家城市商业银行数据为样本,实证分析地方政府行为对城市商业银行风险承担的影响。研究结果表明,地方政府行为对于城市商业银行的风险承担既有正面也有负面的影响。政府持股比例与城市商业银行信贷风险没有显著的关系,但对其流动性风险和偿付风险有负向的影响;政府赤字率与城市商业银行的贷款投放正相关,而政府加大教育和科技投入的治理能有效降低城市商业银行的信贷风险和贷款投放;地方主政官员换届与城市商业银行的贷款投放负相关。进一步的研究发现,区域中心城市地方政府控股对城市商业银行贷款投放风险管理有正向的影响,而城市商业银行跨区域经营的行为也能够增强自身承担风险的能力。

The risk-taking behavior of a commercial bank in pure market environment is a strategy to make balance between profits and risk management. However, Chinese city commercial bank were established with the support of local governments. Local governments have the channel to directly intervene the business decisions of city commercial banks. In addition, most of the ur- ban commercial banks are operated locally. So the local governments can influence the risk-taking of city commercial banks indi- rectly. Under the framework of government control and governance behaviors, research on whether the government behavior has a negative impact on the risk-taking behavior of urban commercial banks is meaningful for the realization of sustainable development of city commercial banks during the ＂new normal＂ period. Based on relevant theories, the paper analyzes the influence of government behavior on the risk-taking of city commercial banks with refined the risk into credit risk, credit supply, liquidity risk and solvency risk. Considering the existence of some en- dogenous correlations, the Seemingly Unrelated Regression （SUR） method is used to establish the equation set. This paper ana- lyzes the impact of local government behavior on the risk-taking of city commercial banks by using the matched data of 45 city commercial banks and corresponding cities in China from 2007 to 2013. The research finds that the local government behavior has both positive and negative effect on the risk-taking of city commer- cial bank. There is no significant relationship between the government shareholding ratio and the credit risk of the urban commer- cial bank, but it has a negative effect on the liquidity risk and the solvency risk. The government deficit rate is positively related to the credit supply of city commercial bank. Besides, the positive governance behavior like government efforts to develop educa- tion and science technology can effectively reduce the city commercial banks＇ credit risk and credit supply. The change of city＇s political head can reduce the credit supply as well. Further examinations find that the share-holding of regional central city government on city commercial bank has a positive impact on the bank＇s risk management. The cross-regional operations of city commercial banks can also enhance their ability to undertake risks.