科学理解的事实性与虚构性

The Factivity and Fictionality of Scientific Understanding

"理解"与"知识"的关系逐渐成为知识论研究的热点。如果理解也是一种知识,则其同样需满足事实性条件。然而,非真的、具有虚构性成分的模型也能提供理解。基于此,埃尔金对理解的事实性条件提出反驳。而对反驳的回应有赖于证明"理解"与知识一样要满足事实性条件,能够提供理解的模型必须忠实地表征对象。事实性条件并不是要求模型符合个别具体事实,而是要求符合所表征的机制性事实。

Virtue epistemology recently focuses on the relationship between understanding and knowledge. Under-standing is supposed to be factive, if it is a species of knowledge. However, fictional models could provide scientific understanding indeed. Therefore, C. Elgin argues that it is not necessary for understanding to be factive in all relative propositions. My replies to Elgin would be that even those fictional models providing understanding should represent objects faithfully. The factivity of understanding does not require models corresponding to particular facts, but to mechanical facts.