多期有限合伙制与公司制的道德风险和机制选择

Repeated Moral Hazard and Mechanism Selection Between Limited Partnership and Corporate System

本文基于委托代理理论和博弈论建立了有限合伙制与公司制下的多期道德风险模型，分析了委托人和代理人如何对这两种机制进行选择的问题．结论表明：两种机制下均存在道德风险问题，且在有限合伙制下因激励程度较高得到改善；两种机制相比较，公司制在特定条件下为博弈双方的最优选择，而有限合伙制只有在博弈双方地位不平等时才能达成．

Based on game theory and Principal-agent theory, this article studies dynamic moral hazard models between corporate system and limited partnership, and analyzes principal and agent＇s optimal choice between mechanisms. The results indicate that moral hazard occurs in both mechanisms while there are improvements in limited partnership. Comparing the two mechanisms under certain conditions, the corporate system can be the best choice to principal and agent. However, limited partnership can＇t be principal and agent＇s common choice when they are of equal status.