CEO权力、高管团队薪酬差距与企业风险承担

CEO Power,Internal Compensation Dispersion and Firm Risk-Taking

基于委托代理理论中代理人风险规避假说,探讨高管团队薪酬差距对企业风险承担水平的影响,并考察CEO权力对二者关系的调节作用。研究结果表明:高管团队薪酬差距能够提升企业风险承担水平,但这一激励效应仅存在于非国有企业中,说明非国有企业中高管团队内部差别化的薪酬体系能起到晋升激励的作用,进而缓解经理人风险规避问题;CEO权力对高管团队薪酬差距与企业风险承担的关系存在负向调节作用。研究结论不但丰富了企业内部薪酬差距的研究,而且对于改善我国企业风险承担水平普遍不高的现状具有一定的现实意义。

Based on Agent Risk Aversion Hypothesis in Principal Agent Theory, this paper discusses the influence of the compensation gap in top executive team on the degree of risk-taking in firms, and the moderating effect on the relationship between them that is brought about by CEO power. Results show that the compensation gap can enhance firms＇ risk-taking but this positive correlation only exists in non-state-owned enterprises. This shows that the internal compensation difference in top management teams of non-state-owned enterprises can stimulate promotion, resulting in easing the tension in agent risk aversion. In addition, the managerial power from CEO will curb this stimulating effect between those two variables. The conclusions not only enrich the study on internal compensation dispersion in firms, but also have practical significance in improving the current low level of risk-taking among enterprises.