政府决策的两难:社会组织的财政扶持与挤出效应

The Dilemma of Government Decision Making:Financial Support for Social Organizations and Crowding Out Effect

选择47家获得政府补助的公益性基金会2007—2013年的非平衡面板数据作为研究对象,分别运用固定效应模型与随机效应模型从筹资与提供公共产品/服务两个方面研究财政补贴政策对社会组织组织行为的影响。实证结果表明:直接性财政补贴政策是把双刃剑,它一方面在强化社会组织能力建设方面发挥着非常重要的作用,有助于强化社会组织公共产品/服务的供给能力;另一方面,直接性的财政补贴政策对社会组织的捐赠筹资产生明显的挤出效应,抑制基金会筹资的努力,加剧了基金会对政府补贴的财政依赖。在对政府补助收入进行分类的基础上,限定性政府补助对社会组织的捐赠筹资产生的挤出效应要弱于非限定性政府补助,而对社会组织提供公共产品/服务能够产生正向的影响,即限定性政府补助的政策效应要优于非限定性政府补助政策。

Selecting the imbalanced panel data of 47 charitable foundations which have acquired government subsidies from 2007 to 2013 as the subject and using the fixed effect model and random effect model, this paper studies the effect of the subsidy policy on organizational behavior of social organizations from the perspectives of financing and public goods or service supply. The empirical result demonstrates that direct fiscal subsidy policy is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it plays a great role in strengthening the capacity building of social organizations and its capacity of providing the public goods or service. On the other hand, this policy can create significant crowding-out effect for donation financing of social organizations, and suppress the financing initiative of foundations, thus aggravating the fiscal dependence on government subsidies. On the basis of categorizing subsidy revenue, restrictive subsidy exerts a weaker crowding-out effect than non-restrictive subsidy, while bringing forth positive influences on public goods or service supply from social organizations. That is to say, the policy effect of restrictive subsidy is better than that of non-restrictive subsidy.