摘要
混合集中的参与人位于不同的产品市场,通常不会对竞争产生限制,但如果其中一方在其所处市场上具有支配地位,而它们的产品在下游市场上又存在互补性,则有可能将这一支配地位传导到另一方所在市场,从而在后一市场上造成第二个支配地位。这种传导既是对第一个支配地位的滥用,又将在后一市场上产生持久的排斥性,因而应对该项集中予以禁止。这是"可口可乐收购汇源果汁经营者集中案"所带来的启示,根据这一认识来对欧盟委员会就"高通与恩智浦集中案"所作的附条件批准决定进行评析,可以发现其所附条件并不足以消除竞争隐患,因而这一决定存在着瑕疵。
The participants of mixed concentration are from different product markets and do not compete with each other, however, when one of them occupies dominant position in one of the market, its strength may be leveraged to another market where another participant is located if their products are supplementary in the downstream market, and thus create another dominant position. This kind of leverage constitutes the abuse of the frst dominant position, and bring about lasting exclusionary effects in the second market, therefore should be prohibited. These knowledge is inspired by the case of Coca-Cola and Huiyuan Juice, and can be used as a theoretical basis for the analysis of the conditional approval by European Commission to Qualcomm's acquisition of NXP recently.
出处
《竞争政策研究》
2017年第6期22-30,共9页
Competition Policy Research
关键词
混合集中
混合合并
垄断
mixed concentration
mixed merger
monopoly