制度理想与现实困境——城乡居保激励机制失效的理论分析

Systematic Ideal and Realistic Predicament——Analyzing the Causes of the Failure about Rural-urban Residents Social Pension Insurance

在参保及缴费档次自愿的前提下,为鼓励城乡居民早参保,选择较高缴费档次,城乡居保制度变"一刀切"为"差别化"缴费补贴方式,但新的补贴方式激励效果并不理想,参保居民仍集中于最低缴费档次。为此,通过精算模型对"差别化"下的个人账户养老金替代率进行模拟测算,发现受过低的缴费水平影响,城乡居保个人账户养老金替代率水平过低,"差别化"补贴方式提高养老金替代率的水平有限。改革目前的城乡居保缴费方式,同时落实参保居民应有的权利,提高制度透明度和信任度,可以提高制度保障水平,减少逆选择现象。

To encourage residents participate earlier and chose higher payment on the voluntary rural-urban social pension insurance,the system set different subsidy according to the payment years and level,more subsidy with longer participate time and higher payment level. But the result is not anxious,most insured residents still choose the lowest payment level. So the paper calculates the pension substitution rate with actuarial model under different subsidy,we find that the lowest contribution level result to a low substitution rate,different subsidy can' t change the substitution rate significantly. A payment method reform,insurance of the insured residents' due rights,and increased in diaphaneity can improved the guarantee level,reduce adverse selection.