企业监督对供应商集群内机会主义行为的影响研究——基于连带责任治理模式

On the Influence of Enterprise's Monitoring on Cluster of Suppliers' Opportunistic Behaviors:Based on Joint Liability Governance Mode

采用问卷调查法,选取82个供应商小组样本,并基于供应链合作关系情境,研究企业监督在对供应商集群实施连带责任治理中的影响。研究发现,随着企业监督的增强,供应商之间的连带责任对同伴监督的正向作用减弱,供应商之间的横向监督对其机会主义行为的负向作用减弱;同时,供应商之间的连带责任通过同伴监督对其机会主义行为产生的间接抑制作用减弱。因此,企业在对供应商集群实施连带责任治理时,应限制对自身权力或地位优势的依赖,减少对供应商的监督,以免抵消集群内同伴监督的效果。

Based on samples of 82 supplier teams and under the context of cooperative relationship in supply chain,this paper explores the influence of enterprise＇s monitoring on implementing joint liability governance to supplier cluster. We find out that as enterprise＇s monitoring increases,the positive effect of joint liability among suppliers on their peer monitoring decreases,and the negative effect of peer monitoring among suppliers on their opportunistic behaviors decreases. Meanwhile,it also weakens the indirect inhibiting effect that suppliers＇ joint liability exerts on opportunistic behaviors through peer monitoring. Therefore,when implementing joint liability governance,the enterprise should limit the dependence on its power or position advantage and reduce its monitoring on suppliers for fear that the effect of peer monitoring within the cluster might be counteracted.