官员独立董事、产权性质与非效率投资的实证研究

The Effect of Independent Directors with Official Background,Nature of Property Right on the Non-Efficiency Investment

利用2012—2015年官员背景独立董事辞职的A股上市公司数据,研究发现官员独立董事的政治背景与企业的过度投资呈负相关关系,与投资不足并无直接联系;进一步研究发现,具有高政治关联的独立董事可以抑制企业的过度投资行为,而与低政治关联的独立董事没有显著相关性。将数据分为国有控股组和非国有控股组,高政治关联独立董事所在国有性质的上市公司偏向"保守"投资,所在非国有性质的上市公司高政治关联独立董事会抑制过度投资行为,而对于低政治关联独立董事所在的国有企业倾向于"激进"投资。

This paper makes an empirical research by using A shares data ranging from 2012 to 2015 of listed companies whose independent directors with official background has resigned. The result shows that the political background of independent directors is negatively correlated to the company 's excessive investment and has no correlation to the company's under-investment. This paper further finds that independent directors with stronger political background can restrain the company's over-investment behavior while there is no significant correlation between independent directors with weaker political background and the company's over-investment behavior. If the companies are divided into state-owned and non-state-owned groups,we can find that the state-owned listed companies with independent directors who have stronger political background have a " conservative" investment motivation,on the contrary,the state-owned listed companies with independent directors who have weaker political background have a " radical" investment motivation. The non-state-owned listed companies with independent directors who have stronger political background have a certain motivation to curb over-investment behavior.