无限主义与强推论创造主义的相容性研究

On the Compatibility Between Infinitism and Strong Inferential Creationism

无限主义是当代解决阿格里帕三难问题的一种进路,但学界的一种批评意见认为无限主义无法解释认知辩护的来源问题。面对这一批评,无限主义者主张推论活动本身也具有创造辩护的功能。坚持推论创造主义使得我们可以更准确地理解推论工具主义的内涵,但强推论创造主义存在着严重的问题,即以涂厉(John Turri)为代表的无限主义者或者无法说明为什么信念辩护可以从无到有,或者无法让强推论创造主义与无限主义相容。排除了强推论创造主义,弱推论创造主义或许是无限主义的一个有希望的理论资源。

Infinitism aims to offer a solution to the Aprippa＇s trilemma,but it faces the objection that infinitism cannot explain where epistemic justification comes from. Infinitists contend that reasoning alone can create justification,and by holding this thesis,one can have a better grip of what inferential instrumentalism says. However,it is argued that strong inferential creationism is problematic,i. e.,the thesis,advocated primarily by John Turri,that reasoning can create justification ex nihilo is implausible. While strong inferential creationism is shown to be dubious,weak inferential creationism might give support to infinitism.