审计师提供并购尽职调查会影响财务报表的审计质量吗？

Does Auditors' M&A Due Diligence Services Affect Audit Quality of Post-M&A Financial Report?

本文探讨由财务报告审计师提供并购尽职调查产生的信息优势、自利偏差和经济依赖如何影响合并财务报告的审计质量,并以2011~2014年审计师提供并购尽职调查的样本进行实证研究。研究发现,并购方聘请财务报告审计师提供并购尽职调查,会显著地降低并购后合并财务报告的审计质量,而且当并购资产规模越大,审计质量下降的程度越高;当提供并购尽职调查的人员参与并购后财务报告审计工作的程度越高,财务报告审计质量越低。经济依赖性与自利偏差是解释这些结果的机制。进一步研究发现,投资者对财务报告审计师提供并购尽职调查业务是不认同的。研究结论为规范我国非审计业务发展,完善注册会计师执业规范和制定相关政策提供了机制和理论依据。

We examine how information advantages, self-serving bias and economic dependence affect the audit quality of financial report after an auditor provides M＆A due diligence. By analyzing M＆A transactions and accounting firms＇ M＆A due diligence services from 2011 to 2014, we find that when an acquirer chooses auditor of financial report to provide M＆A due diligence service, the audit quality of post M＆A financial report becomes worse. The negative relation is more significant for the M＆A of larger target size. When the percentage of auditors who provide M＆A due diligence services also taking part in the post M＆A financial report audit is higher, the audit quality of post M＆A financial report is worse. Self-serving bias and economic dependence provide theoretical explanation for these results. Furthermore, investors always give negative response to the M＆A due diligence services provided by financial report auditors. These results provide a theoretical basis for supporting the development of non-audit services in China, improving CPA professional standards and formulating relevant policies.