开放式创新网络中的价值独占机制:打开“开放性”和“与狼共舞”悖论

Innovation Appropriability in Open Innovation Network:Visiting Openness and Swimming-with-Sharks Dilemmas

技术和市场能力相对落后的后发企业在构建全球创新网络过程中不可避免地会遇到两个悖论:权衡开放度(Openness)来获取知识的同时避免知识外泄这一"开放性"悖论;必须与国际领先企业建立连带以获取知识且避免被其破坏自身价值获取的"与狼共舞"悖论。为了解决这两个悖论,本文基于归纳式的案例研究方法,构建了"后发企业从开放式创新网络中价值独占"的理论框架。本文发现,探索式创新网络战略主要通过主导范式设计与因果模糊机制作用于国内市场的价值独占,利用式创新网络战略主要通过因果模糊机制与互补性资产机制作用于国际市场的价值独占。这些结论对开放式创新理论和后发企业追赶理论均有一定贡献,也对中国后发企业有一定启示意义。

Two important yet underexplored dilemmas are faced by Chinese latecomer firms who want to achieve innovation catchup by building open innovation networks around the world. Openness dilemma is defined as Chinese latecomer firms need to balance the benefits and costs of building open innovation network, while" swimming with sharks "dilemma means these firms need to balance the benefits and danger of connecting with world leading firms. Based upon a typical inductive case study, we propose a theoretical framework of profiting from open innovation network by latecomers, thus provide a possible solution for both dilemmas mentioned above. We find that exploratory innovation network strategy affects the domestic market monopoly mainly through the dominant paradigm design and causal fuzzy mechanism, while utilization innovative network strategy mainly through the role of causal fuzzy mechanism and complementary asset mechanism.Our results also have important implications for both open innovation theory and catch-up literature, and also for managers of Chinese latecomer firms.