私营企业腐败有助于获取银行授信并缓解融资难吗?

Does Corruption Grease the Wheels of Bank Lending and Ease the Financing Constraint of Private Firms?

文章以广受关注的私营企业融资难和银行贷款腐败问题为背景,基于世界银行提供的中国企业调查数据,实证考察了腐败对私营企业融资行为及其后果的影响。结果表明,用于近似刻画腐败活动的企业人均招待费,确实被企业用作不正当竞争的手段：招待费支出越多,企业获得银行等金融机构授信的概率和额度也越高。然而,进一步的研究表明,腐败并未真正缓解企业的融资压力;相反,甚至加剧了融资约束在企业发展中的瓶颈效应。

In transition economies without a good financial market, does corruption benefits private firms with financial resources？ When private firms have financing problems and banks are exposed to credit corruption, we investigate the effects of corruption, which is measured by entertaining expenditure, on private firms＇ financial behavior and consequences, using the big data of the China Investment Climate Survey from the World Bank. We confirm that entertaining expenditures are surely used by firms as means of malfeasant competition because the more entertaining expenditures, the greater probability and quotas of bank credit. However, corruption does not really alleviate firms＇ pressure in terms of funding, but increases the adverse consequences of finan- cial restraints.