上市公司会因行业竞争压力上调公司盈余吗

Could Listed Companies Increase Earnings for Pressure of Industrial Competition

信号传递理论表明,投资者在进行投资决策时,不仅关注所投资上市公司的盈余信息,还会关注同行业上市公司的盈余信息并进行对比分析。基于投资者的这种投资决策行为,如果在业绩预告中的业绩比行业平均水平差,那么上市公司会感知到行业竞争压力。在此压力下,上市公司可能在披露年报盈余时把原预告盈余调高。实证结果表明,上市公司感知的行业竞争压力与公司盈余的上调幅度正相关。进一步研究表明,这种关系只在非国有上市公司中及销售收入在同行业中排行5%-95%的上市公司中存在。上市公司多元化经营及迎合分析师预测的动机不影响研究结论。

The theory of information transfer shows that investors not only focus on the earnings information of the listed company itself, but also concern with the earnings information of other listed com- panies in the same industry, and carry on the contrast analysis. Thus, if the forecasted performance is worse than average level of same industry, then the listed company may perceive some pressure of industrial competition. Under this pressure, the listed company may increase its earnings to meet investors＇ expectation. Current literature about earning management have not yet studied the motivation of this kinds of pressure. Based on pressure of psychological theory, this paper explores the relationship between perceived pressure of indus- trial competition and earnings management. It uses the gap between forecasted earnings of listed company and that of average level of listed companies in same industry to measure pressure of industrial completion, the gap between annual earnings and forecasted earnings to measure the extent of earnings management. Controlling the extent of diversity, industrial concentration, companies＇ characteristics, and corporate governance, the regression result shows that the perceived pressure of industrial competition positively correlates with the extent of the gap between annual earnings and forecasted earnings. This result indicates that management of listed companies may manage earnings in face of industrial competition. Further analyses show that this relationship only exists in state-owned companies or companies whose performance rank 5%-95% in the same industry. Diversity and the incentive of meeting analyst forecast could not change the conclu- sion. This paper firstly analyzes a new form of earnings management that adjusting forecasted earnings to a larger amount in annual report, and contributes to the literature about motivation of earnings man- agement. The conclusion provides a new prospect for investors to use earnings information for investment decisions, and provides a new way for regulators to detect the behavior of earnings management.