摘要
我国农村融资在博弈结构和博弈规则方面的不均衡,造成了博弈双方信息不对称、合作博弈观念不强以及监督不足等问题。提出了在遵循经济公平、经济安全、适度干预和整体效率原则下,正规金融机构向民营企业和农户贷款时应给予一定的优惠,以完善我国农村政策性金融体系,明确农村民间融资的法律地位,规范农村民间融资组织,建立和完善农村民间融资信用制度,加大农村民间融资的监管机制建设等。
The imbalance of game structure and game rules in China rural financing leads to some problems like the existence of serious information asymmetry,the weakness of cooperative game concept and the lack of effective supervision mechanism.Therefore,it is suggested that under the principles of economic fairness,economic security,moderate intervention and overall efficiency,formal financial institutions should give certain preference to private enterprises and farmers when offering loans to them,so as to perfect our rural policy-related financial system.Meanwhile,it is necessary to declare the lawful position of rural non-governmental financing,normalize the rural non-governmental financing organizations,establish and improve the credit system of rural non-governmental financing and increase the supervision mechanism construction of rural non-governmental financing.
出处
《西安石油大学学报(社会科学版)》
2018年第1期63-69,74,共8页
Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University:Social Science Edition
基金
江西省社会科学规划项目(16ZK49)
关键词
农村融资
法经济学
博弈论
信息不对称
纳什均衡
经济人
rural financing
law and economics
game theory
information asymmetry
Nash equilibrium
economic man