线上平台搭便车效应下O2O渠道供应链定价策略研究

Research on Pricing Policies in an O2O Channel Supply Chain under the Free-Riding Effect of Online Platform

基于线上平台借助线下实体店提供服务的搭便车现象，研究了O2O渠道供应链中成员的定价策略以及搭便车效应对渠道利润的影响。考虑市场中增加线上渠道之后，同时存在线上平台和线下实体店，以及可以从这两个渠道选择的消费者组成的O2O供应链系统。利用Stackelberg博弈模型，分析了集中式下和分散式下的最优定价策略。探究了服务水平、搭便车效应系数、补贴策略对渠道定价决策、利润的影响。结果发现，线上平台通过搭便车效应，能够有效增加两个渠道的价格和利润；补贴策略使得线上平台价格提高，但却使其利润降低。说明补贴模式并不能为两个渠道对象提高收益，仅能促进双方合作。

Based on the phenomenon of online platform taking advantage of the free-riding effect upon service offline store that provides, the pricing policies of members inO2O channel supply chain and the effects of free-riding on profit of channel were studied. The O2O supply chain system, which consists of the online platform and offline store existing meanwhile after adding the online channel, as well as the consumers who can choose from two channels, was taken into consideration. The Staekelberg game model was adopted to analyze the optimal pricing policies through the centralized and the decentralized mode. That how service level, free-riding coefficient and bonus strategy effect the pricing policies and profits of channel was investigated. The results suggest that.the online platform can increase the profits and price of two channels effectively by free-riding effect ; bonus strategy can increase the price of online and decrease the profit of online platform. It means bonus mode can not improve the revenue both online and offline and can only promote mutal cooperation.