上市公司管理层修正公告披露策略的市场反应

Market Reaction of Management's Disclosure Strategy of the Listed Company

伴随着业绩预告产生的业绩预告修正公告,是上市公司信息披露制度的重要组成部分。上市公司管理层会利用信息优势在制度容许的范围内有倾向性地选择业绩修正公告披露策略,以趋利避害;处于信息劣势的市场投资者会对管理层业绩修正公告披露策略进行自行解读,并借助交易行为引发股价波动。论文基于2007—2016年中国上市公司业绩修正公告,对管理层业绩修正公告披露策略及市场反应展开研究。结果发现:相较于之前的业绩预告,若修正公告为好消息,管理层倾向于尽早发布高精度的修正公告;反之,则倾向于延迟发布低精度的修正公告。当修正公告为好消息时,预计业绩精度下降或在次年1月后公布会削弱市场对正向修正的反应;当修正公告为坏消息时,预计业绩精度下降或在会计年度结束后发布会增强市场对负向修正的反应。进一步的研究还发现,管理层倾向于在"利好减弱"的坏消息情况下提高预计业绩精度,在"利空减弱"的好消息情况下延迟公布修正公告。基于此,提出了完善我国资本市场业绩预告修正公告制度的政策建议。

Accompanied by the establishment of earnings forecast, the management earnings forecast revision is a crucial constitution of the information disclosure system of listed companies. The management has the tendency to select the disclosure strategy by the advantage of information within an allowable range. The investors with the disadvantage of information will read the strategy by themselves and make investment choices leading to price fluctuations. To this end, the paper studies the disclosure strategy and market reaction of management earnings forecast revision based on the practice of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2016. The results show that： when the forecast revision is a good news compared with the early forecast, the management inclines to release forecast revision of higher precision early, otherwise, the reverse. When the forecast revision is positive, the width of the earnings forecast has a negative effect on the market reaction of the forecast revision, and the market reaction of the forecast revision which releases later than January 1st is weaker. When the forecast revision is negative, the market reaction of the forecast revision with lower precision released after the end of the fiscal year is fiercer. Further study shows that, the management inclines to increase the precision of the disclosure of positive reductions, and release the news of negative reductions later. Based on these, the paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the management earnings forecast revision from the dimension of securities regulatory authorities.