情感主义德性知识论:超越责任主义与可靠主义

Sentimentalist Virtue Epistemology:Beyond Responsibilism and Reliabilism

情感主义德性知识论,它可以超越目前德性知识论两种最主要的形式,即责任主义与可靠主义。包容和决断这两种认知德性有助于情感主义进路超越责任主义。责任主义无法充分证成居于下一级的基于知觉、记忆或归纳的信念。另一方面,可靠主义的问题在于,它对基于知觉、记忆或归纳的信念的合理性证明仅仅基于隶属于人的认知系统的德性。拟证明,一种注重情感主义之基础地位的德性知识论,如何可能准确地说明认知的品性特征的确有助于证成我们的知觉信念、记忆信念、归纳(也包括溯因)信念的合理性。认知上的决断涉及归纳的合理性证明,而认知上的包容涉及知觉的合理性证明,同时二者相互涵摄。通过倡导的人格主义进路将德性知识论引向情感主义的方向,从而丰富了德性知识论的可能性。

This thesis argues that sentimentalist virtue epistemology can go beyond responsibilism and reliabilism,which currently are the two main forms of virtue epistemology. As epistemic virtues,receptivity and decisiveness are essential for sentimentalist virtue epistemology to overcome responsibilism. Responsibilism cannot adequately account for low-grade perceptual,memory,and inductive justification. In contrast,reliabilists base the rational justification of ordinary perceptual,memory,and inductive beliefs solely on the virtues of sub-personal cognitive systems. This thesis shows that a virtue epistemology that takes sentimentalism seriously at the foundational level can pinpoint epistemic person-level character traits that do serve to justify our perceptual,memory,and inductive（ also abductive） belief. By treating decisiveness as involved in inductive justification and receptivity as involved in perceptual justification; epistemic receptivity involves epistemic decisiveness and vice versa. It turns out that the Personalist approach advocated here enriches the possibilities for virtue epistemology by taking it in a sentimentalist direction.