摘要
在实际中,消费者购买耐用品时均同时获得厂商提供的质保服务,由于产品质保服务影响着消费者的产品使用效用,因此耐用品定价、质保期和产品质保服务投入是影响厂商利润的主要因素。考虑双寡头市场环境下,建立微分博弈模型讨论单位产品质保服务投入和产品质保期对双寡头厂商均衡价格的影响。结论表明双寡头厂商的单位产品质保服务投入越高、质保期越长,均衡价格越高;但单位产品保服务投入与质保服务对消费者效用影响系数的关系影响着竞争对手在均衡价格的变化趋势;劣势的低质量厂商可以通过增加单位产品质保服务投入策略或延长质保期的策略实现在均衡下与高质量厂商以同等价格销售耐用品,但劣势厂商增加单位产品质保服务投人策略要优于延长质保期策略。最后,利用数值分析进一步验证了所得结论的有效性。
In practice, more and more durable goods manufacturers take use of warranty service to obtian the competitive advantage. Manufacturers provide warranty service for consumers who buy durable goods.Price, warranty period and warranty service expense are the main factors influencing manufactuer's prof- its, due to product warranty services affecting the consumer's utility. Duopoly firms provide the same du- rable goods with different quality in the market. Product failure is random and subject to exponential func- tion. Duopoly firms provide free reparation service within warranty period. In this paper~ price is defined as the decision variable, and the differential game model is constructed to discuss the effect of unit product warranty service expenses and quality period on the equilibrium price for duopoly firms. And then how the inferior manufacturer achieves the same price with the high quality manufacturer through warranty period strategy is analyzed and warranty service strategy is analyzed. Results indicate that the higher the unit product warranty service expenses of duopoly firms and the longer the warranty period, the equilibrium price is higher. But the relationship between the consumer utility influence coefficient and unit product war- ranty service expenses affects the change of competitor^s equilibrium price. The inferior manufacturer pro- viding low quality products makes use of the strategies of increasing unit product warranty service expenses and extending warranty period to realize the same price with the high quality manufacturers under the equi- librium. In addition, the effects of different strategies of the inferior manufacturer on warranty cost are compared, and it is found out that the strategy of increasing unit product warranty service expenses is bet- ter than extending warranty period strategy. Finally, numerical analysis are used to further verify the ef- fectiveness of the conclusion. So this paper not only provides theoretical guidance for manufacturers to im- plement warranty service, but also extends the scope of warranty service research.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第2期142-151,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71640018)
关键词
微分博弈
耐用品
质保期
质保服务投入
均衡价格
differential games
durable goods
warranty period
warranty service expenses
equilibriumprice