政府监管下的企业安全生产行为研究——基于前景理论的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Safety Production Behavior Supervision of Enterprises Based on Prospect Theory

针对我国频发的企业安全生产事故问题，从监管部门的角度出发将前景理论引入到企业安全生产的监管研究中，并运用演化博弈理论，构建企业与监管部门的博弈支付矩阵来分析二者的博弈过程，从而得到影响企业安全生产行为的影响因素及约束条件．结果表明：企业安全生产行为主要受安全生产成本、监管部门的惩罚力度、安全事故发生概率、安全事故给企业带来的损失、监管成本等因素的影响；由于不同企业风险规避系数不同，政府补贴可能会产生负面效应，在政府补贴失效的情况下可采取加大监管力度与处罚强度的办法．

Focusing on the frequent accidents of safety production in enterprises of our country, this article introduces the prospect theory to the study of enterprise safety produc- tion supervision from the standpoint of supervision departments. The influencing factors and the constraint conditions of enterprise safety production behavior are obtained by using evolutionary game theory to build game pay-off matrix between enterprises and supervision departments. The results show that： the behavior of safety production in enterprises is mainly influenced by safety production cost, punishment of supervision departments~ prob~ ability of safety accident, enterprise loss caused by safety accident and the supervision cost; Due to the different risk aversion coefficient of different coal mine enterprises, government subsidies may even have a negative effect. In the case of failure of government subsidies, effective measures need to be taken to increase the intensity of supervision and punishment to ensure the safety production.