阶层分化、资源动员与村级贿选现象——以东部地区G镇调查为基础

Stratification,Resource Mobilization and Bribery in the Village Election: Based on the Survey of G Village in the Eastern Area

村级贿选是东部地区村级民主选举的顽疾,它的发生除了制度不健全外,主要与当地农民高度分化有关。高度分化导致高收入阶层农民较低收入阶层农民更有意愿竞选村干部,而低收入阶层农民的原子化和离散化,则进一步降低了他们的一致行动能力和政治效能感。同时,高度分化造成了阶层间的区隔和不信任感,亲情、人情和面子等传统动员方式失效,贿选成为有效的动员方式。村级贿选加剧了上层农民对村庄政治的垄断,加深了低收入阶层农民的政治无力感,需要在政治和技术层面予以遏制。

Bribery in the village election is a deep-rooted issue of village election in the eastern area,and,except for the imperfect electing system,the reason is mainly attributed to the high differentiation of local people.This leads to the fact that the farmers from the upper level are more willing to participate in the election than lower level farmers,meanwhile,lower level farmers become atomized and dissociated,which further weakens their ability of unanimous action and political efficiency.On the other hand,high differentiation causes the distance and trust crisis between different levels,and the traditional way of mobilization,such as family affection or guanxi network,fails to work,and as a consequence,bribery has become an effective way to mobilize.The bribery in village election increases political monopoly by farmers from the upper level,and deepens the sense of incapability in political participation of farmers from lower level,thus it should be constrained in the aspect of both politics and practical operation.