摘要
依据专业合作社内开展信用合作所具有的互联性交易特征,利用关联博弈分析工具,研究了合作社与社员之间的生产合作声誉对上述困境的改善。研究证明,专业合作社内开展信用合作,借助专业合作社与社员之间已有的生产合作声誉,能够实现对社员信用合作道德风险的进一步抑制。同时,社员在生产合作上获取的超额收益以及社员借款规模分别对社员信用合作道德风险抑制起到提升和阻碍作用。
Based on the characteristics of interconnectional-transaction in credit cooperatives in professional cooperatives,this paper studies the improvement of dilemma by the cooperation of cooperatives and members. The research proves that credit cooperatives are carried out in professional cooperatives,and the moral hazard of credit cooperation between members and cooperatives can be restrained by the reputation of production cooperation between professional cooperatives and members. At the same time,the excess returns of production cooperation and the amount of loan in the effectiveness to enhance or inhibit moral hazard in members credit cooperation.
出处
《华南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第2期83-94,共12页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金(71673138
71273138)
农业部软科学研究项目(D201742)
关键词
信用合作
互联性交易
关联博弈
道德风险
合作声誉
credit cooperation
Interlinked contract
linked game
moral hazard
cooperation reputation