基于不对称Nash谈判修正的产学研协同创新战略联盟收益分配研究

The benefit assignment research on industry-university-research cooperative innovation strategy alliance based on modified asymmetric nash negotiation

产学研协同创新战略联盟是建设自主创新国家,打造经济升级版的主要担纲者,科学合理的收益分配机制是提高联盟凝聚力的前提条件。针对以往不对称Nash谈判联盟收益分配的缺陷,综合考虑了联盟中各成员在协作中的重要程度,成员对分配方案的满意程度,成员的风险分担程度以及联盟成员绩效等影响收益分配的要素,给出了各影响因素的测度方法及不对称Nash谈判修正的系数矩阵。有效地规避了传统不对称Nash谈判收益分配平均化的不足,大幅提高联盟成员投入产出的有效性及风险承担能力,提高了联盟的稳定性。

The innovation alliance strategy among industry, university, and research institutes plays a main role in building an innovative country, and making economic progress. The scientific and reasonable mechanisms for the achievement is the precondition of improving alliance cohesion. This is an effective way of reversing synergy of innovation alliance members＇ interests and risk transfer. This paper investigates asymmetric Nash negotiation and synthetically considers influencing factors, such as the importance of each member in the cooperation, the satisfaction of allocation program, the degree of risk sharing, and the influence of alliance performance. The findings of this study can provide new approaches to measure influential factors and modify coefficient matrix of asymmetric Nash negotiation. Firstly, this paper tries to understand barriers to the formation of production-study-research cooperative innovation strategy alliance. Those barriers may include the pursuit of self-interests by alliance members, and other factors causing the negotiations for unequal income distribution alliance. Secondly, according to Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we were able to calculate the best discount coefficient of alliance benefits after negotiation, all union members＇ income distribution, and income distribution coefficient matrix. In addition, we were able to identify the league members in the important degree of collaboration, members of allocation of satisfaction, members of the degree of risk sharing, and alliance performance measure of the influence of income distribution elements. We integrate related factors into the income distribution in order to determine innovation strategy alliance income distribution matrix that includes the influential factors for income distribution. Finally, we use the case-based methodology and a case example to explain how an enterprise, a research institution, a science and technology intermediary service, and a financial services institution collaborate with each other in a successful strategic alliance. The findings of this study are able to effectively avoid the shortage of average income distribution of traditional asymmetric Nash negotiation, enhance members＇ validity of input and output, and improve alliance stability.