考虑再制造品商标许可和担保的策略组合分析

Strategy combinations analysis considering trademark licensing and warranty of remanufactured products

考虑一个生产新产品的原始设备制造商(OEM)和一个生产再制造品的再制造商(REM)组成的竞争系统。REM在考虑是否为其再制造品购买OEM的商标许可以及是否实施担保时,会陷入进退两难的策略选择问题。由此,建立双产品竞争下的四种策略组合博弈模型,由博弈结果分析各策略组合下产量的影响因素、环保效果以及各策略组合最终的演化趋势。结果表明:新产品(再制造品)的产量与商标许可价格以及担保费用正(负)相关;REM不实施任何策略时,环保效果最优;REM实施双策略时,环保效果最劣;四种策略组合之间可能的演化趋势是REM只为其再制造品实施担保;虽然此时OEM的利润较低,但其可采用增加担保服务水平的策略来提高利润,同时可增加再制造品的产量。

The fast update of products increases the number of EOL products（end of life products） in the market. Under the constraints of several environmental regulations, original equipment manufacturers（OEMs） consider the recycling of their EOL products. For all the methods of handling EOL products, remanufacturing becomes the first choice by OEMs（e.g. Kodak, IBM and Xerox, etc） because of their better economic and environmental effects. Additional, the National Development and Reform Commission of China also identified parts remanufacturing enterprises and product scope through the enactment of Automotive Parts Remanufacturing Management Measures, which can accelerate the development of the remanufacturing industry in China. However, due to the factor of geographical position or others, some OEMs don＇t want to implement product remanufacturing because of the high logistic cost for product recycling and the higher risk for choosing recycling channels. Based on such situation, some third-party companies（Remanufacturers, REM for short） are motivated to enter the remanufacturing market. REMs＇ remanufacturing activities would inevitably have impact on intellectual property（patent, trademark licensing）, participants（recycling channels, the powerful structure）, and extension services（quality assurance）, etc. The problem considered in this paper is that REMs face two strategic choices：（1） Whether remanufactured products use the original new product＇s trademark or not; and（2） Whether remanufactured products should implement warranty. However, the related laws and regulations suggested that REMs should be given the right to use the trademark of OEMs, and there are no special recommendations to be given for this transaction. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no literatures studied the issue of remanufactured products＇ warranty. From this point of view, REMs that purchase the trademark license from OEMs will increase customer＇s willingness to buy the remanufactured products even though they have to defray for trademark license. Similarly, REMs will also face the dilemma of increasing remanufacturing cost or improving the willing-to-price when they consider warranty problems for their remanufactured products. This paper studies strategy combinations of the proposed problem when a REM considers how to choose trademark license and warranty. The strategy combinations include four models, regardless of whether the REM implements trademark license purchasing and warranty or not. This paper will clarify the following questions：（i） What factors can influence the production policy of REM and OEM in four strategic combinations？（ii） What are the effect of environmental performance under each strategic combination？（iii） Which one of the four strategic combinations is the possible ultimate evolutionary trend？ In order to answer these questions, the paper establishes four game models under double product competition. The influencing factors of production change, environmental performance, and the ultimate evolutionary trend among the four strategic combinations are obtained by analyzing the game model. The study shows that the production of new products（remanufactured products） has positive（negative） correlation with trademark license fees as well as warranty fees. If REM does not implement any strategy, environmental performance is optimal. If REM implements double strategies, environmental performance is the worst. Comparing with the changes of strategy implementation effect, the return efficiency of product is more sensitive to the changes of strategy implementation cost. The final evolutionary trend is that REM only implements warranty for its remanufactured products. Although OEM＇s profit is lower in such situation, it can improve the level of warranty service strategy to increase profit and the amount of recycling under certain conditions. In order to keep some strategic combinations for a long time, OEM can achieve the purpose by compensating REM from its own profit. In order to simplify the considered problem, the paper assumes that OEMs only produce new products. However, if OEMs consider the implementation of remanufacturing, which form of remanufacturers＇ strategic combinations will become the trend for trademark licensing and warranty？ In addition, if OEMs want to shrink remanufactured products＇ market demand through upgrading products, what strategic combinations will be carried out？ All these issues are to be researched in future.