宗族网络抑制了农村商业保险的发展吗——基于“千村调查”数据的实证研究

Does Kinship Networks Restrain the Development of Private Insurance?——An Empirical Study Based on the “Survey on Thousands Villages”

非正式制度对经济决策的影响是经济研究的重要主题。基于上海财经大学2015年"千村调查"数据,本文考察了宗族网络对农村商业保险发展的影响。研究表明,宗族网络对商业保险决策具有负向影响,拥有更强宗族网络的农户购买商业保险的可能性和保费支出更低,即宗族网络抑制了农村商业保险的发展。进一步研究发现,宗族网络对不同收入组农户的商业保险决策具有异质性影响,具体而言,对低收入组农户的商业保险决策具有显著的负向影响,而对高收入组农户的商业保险决策无影响。最后,金融教育培训能够有效缓解宗族网络对商业保险发展的抑制作用。本文的研究对构建多层次的农村社会保障体系具有重要的启示意义。

Based on the data of 5951 households collected from the program of Thousands of Villages Survey of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics( SUFE) in 2015,this paper studies the effect of kinship networks on private insurance decision. The results show that( 1) Kinship networks have negative effect on private insurance decision,that means the informal insurance system based on kinship networks have an "substitution effect"on the private insurance;( 2) Dividing the sample into low-income group and high-income group,the result shows that the "substitution effect"mainly exists in the low-income group,and kinship networks have no impact on the private insurance decision of the high-income group; and( 3) Financial education not only promotes the development of private insurance,but also reduces the negative impact of the kinship networks on private insurance decision.