内外部人异质信念与企业的投资决策

Companies' Investment Decisions under Heterogeneous Beliefs between Insiders and Outsiders

构建了内外部人异质信念通过市场时机机制和迎合机制影响企业投资的理论模型,并在对模型结论进行具体讨论的基础上提出实证研究假设。在此基础上,使用我国上市公司2004—2013年的样本数据进行了实证检验,并结合我国股权高度集中的制度环境背景对研究进行了拓展性探讨。结果发现:当外部人相对内部人对企业价值更为乐观时,企业的投资支出增加,且过度投资程度更严重;内外部人之间的异质信念主要通过迎合机制对上市公司的投资决策产生具体影响,且该机制仅在控制大股东控制权私利水平较高时起显著作用;内外部人异质信念通过市场时机影响企业投资的作用效果较为有限,原因可能在于,内外部人异质信念下因有利市场时机而增加的企业权益融资未被用于企业的新增投资支出。

This study constructs a theoretical model to show that how insiders-outsiders heterogeneous beliefs can influence companies＇ investment decisions through ＂market timing mechanism＂and ＂cater mechanism＂. The study uses data of Chinese listed firms during 2004-2013 as a sample,to test the empirical conclusions under China＇s special ownership concentration background. The main conclusions are as follows.Firstly,when the outside investors are more optimistic relative to insiders,Chinese companies are more likely to increase investment spending and be more serious over-invest. Secondly,the significant influence of heterogeneous beliefs between insiders and outsiders on investment decisions of Chinese listed firms is mainly caused by catering mechanism,and the significant influence is found only if controlling shareholders＇ private benefit is high. Thirdly,the effect on investment decisions of＂market timing mechanism＂under insiders-outsiders heterogeneous beliefs is limited,and the cause is more likely because that the companies use raised equity fund for other purposes except investment when they time the market.