摘要
本文以2003-2015年发生的1147起国有上市公司多元化并购事件为样本,实证检验政府干预对国有企业选择并购对象表现出产权、行业和地区偏好的影响。研究结果显示:政府干预显著影响国企并购偏好。受地方政府目标多元性和寻租影响,地方国企的国有产权偏好更明显;由于中央和地方政府提高国有经济控制力、发展经济的目标一致,央企和地方国企对控制行业并购的偏好无显著差异;央企比地方国企更偏好跨区并购,以在更大范围内实现资源优化配置。
This article takes the M&A events carried out by State-owned listing companies in 2003-2015 as samples to test the influence of government intervention to M&A preferences. Result shows that degree of government intervention would signifi- cantly affect the preference. Because of the multiple goals and rent-seeking of local government, the local companies have more significant preference to State-owned property rights, with a same target for the central and the local government of im- proving the control power of State-owned economy and developing economic, there is no obvious difference in industry prefer- ence between central and local State-owned companies. Central companies would like to carry out diversified M&A in differ- ent regions, in order to realize the optimization of resource allocation in a larger scale.
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
2017年第9期4-15,共12页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71202113)
国家社会科学基金项目(11BGL028)
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究项目<国有股权
关键资源与国有企业多元化并购>(2016SJD630081)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
政府干预
多元化并购
并购对象
并购偏好
Government Intervention
Diversified M&A
M&A Target
M&A Preference