摘要
本文基于关系契约理论的分析框架,以我国2007-2014年上市公司为样本,结合人际交往的和谐观,实证检验了董事长—总经理老乡关系对公司研发投入的影响。研究结果表明,董事长和总经理的区域(行政区域和方言区域)一致性与公司研发投入显著负相关,即董事长—总经理老乡关系抑制了公司的研发投入。进一步的分组研究结果表明,董事长—总经理老乡关系对研发投入的抑制作用仅体现于低市场化程度地区,在高市场化程度地区作用不明显。
This paper investigates the effects of Chairman-CEO hometown complex as a relational contract on R＆D investment behavior of Chinese listed finns. Using the hand-collected id information of Chairmen and general managers in Chinese listed companies over the 2007-2014 period, this paper empirically studies whether and how Chairman-CEO hometown complex curb R＆D investment of Chinese listed firms. The results show that Chairman-CEO hometown complex is significantly negatively associated with the R＆D investment, suggesting that Chairman-CEO hometown complex do curb significantly R＆D invest- ment. Furthermore, compared to the regions with higher marketization process, the Chairman-CEO hometown complex only curb significantly R＆D investment in the regions with lower marketization process.
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
2017年第9期60-82,共23页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71790602
71572162)
教育部人文社科基地重大项目(16JJD790032)的资助
关键词
老乡关系
关系契约
研发投入
市场化程度
Hometown Complex
Relational Contract
R＆D
Marketization Process
