大而少罚?——来自重庆市工业企业环境行政处罚的经验证据

Too Big to Regulation:Evidence from Environmental Administrative Penalty in Chongqing

在中国,环境立法与有效执行之间存在鸿沟,依法治污面临诸多挑战,特别地,企业规模大小是影响环境执法的关键因素。在理论上,一方面,在缺乏外部监督和属地化管理模式下,地方政府"保增长"的施政理念会迫使环境管制为辖区经济增长让路,进而要求放松对规模较大企业的环境管制;另一方面,分级监管的工作思路使得地方环保部门倾向于将规模较大的企业列为重点监察对象,从而加强环境管制。利用重庆市微观企业环境罚款数据,本文对企业规模与环境管制之间的关系进行检验。研究表明,企业规模与罚款概率正相关。在考虑到企业隶属关系、相对规模等因素的稳健性检验中,这一关系均成立,这意味着在对重庆市规模以上工业企业的环境管制中,并未发现对规模较大的企业存在偏袒行为。

Using firm level data of environmental administrative penalty in Chongqing, this paper empirically examines the impact of firm size on environmental regulation. Theoretically, on the one hand, with pressure of enhancing economic growth, local environmental protection bureaus（EPBs） are less likely to implement strict regulations against firms with large influence on local economy. On the other hand, to achieve good governance with limit resources, local EPBs usually regulate a few firms tightly, who discharge with mass pollution and take them as an example for other firms. Employing environmental administrative penalty of industrial firm- level data from Chongqing, we find that, firms with larger size are more likely to be fined, and this finding remains across robust tests.