摘要
我国中小企业数量众多,存在大量的资金需求。同时,因中小企业授信风险相对较高,商业银行存在"惜贷"现象。为解决此种矛盾,一些地区尝试推行政银合作模式,即在中小企业与商业银行信贷关系之间,引入政府财政资金等担保方式,从而降低业务风险、提高信贷可得性。本文针对基于园区的政银合作,通过分析合作各方的收益与风险,并使用博弈论方法,阐述政、银、企各方选择的策略组合对其收益的影响,从而提出优化政银合作模式的政策建议。
The re are plenty of small-and-medium-sized enterprises in China and they need capital badly. Meanwhile, because the credit risks of small-and-medium-sized enterprises are relatively high, commercial banks are reluctant to make loans to them. To solve the problem, some areas tried to carry out government and bank cooperation mode,which means fiscal funds of government act as grantors between small-and-medium-sized enterprises and commercial banks in order to reduce business risks and increase credit availability. By discussing income and risk of cooperation parties, the paper analyzed the targeted districts with game theory. After elucidating the effects of strategy combination on income for government, banks and enterprises respectively, the paper provided some suggestions to optimize the cooperation mode between government and banks.
出处
《上海立信会计金融学院学报》
2017年第5期38-49,共12页
Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance
关键词
中小企业
政银合作
银行
贷款
博弈
Small-and-medium-sized enterprises
Cooperation between government and bank
Bank
Loan
Game theory