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基于时间偏好不一致的供应链碳减排动态投资决策研究 被引量:5

Research on the Dynamic Investment Decision for Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chain Based on Time-Inconsistent Preference
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摘要 基于随机双曲折现模型,考虑时间偏好不一致对供应链碳减排投资决策和效用的影响。在不确定需求下,建立供应链企业时间偏好不一致时跨期决策的动态规划模型,研究集中式决策时制造商和零售商合作减排的策略均衡,以及分散化决策时双方基于Stackelberg微分博弈的反馈策略均衡。结果表明,两种情形下制造商和零售商的碳减排投资决策以及制造商分担零售商碳减排投资的比例均不受时间偏好不一致的影响;但集中式决策时供应链系统的期望效用、分散化决策时制造商和零售商的期望效用均受时间偏好不一致的影响;并且当时间偏好不一致程度越强时,决策者获取的期望效用越小。 This paper investigates the influence of time-inconsistent preference on investment decision and utility for carbon emission reduction in supply chain based on Stochastic Hyperbolic Discounting model. Under uncertain demand, it builds a dynamic programming model for intertemporal decision making of supply chain enterprises with time-inconsistent preference, and analyzes the manufacturer and the retailer's cooperative reduction strategy equilibrium on centralized decision, and the feedback strategy equilibrium by Stackelberg differential game on decentralized decision. Results show that in both cases the manufacturer and the retailer's investment decisions for carbon emission reduction are independent of time-inconsistent pref- erence, as well as the proportion the manufacturer shares retailer's investment for carbon emission reduction, while supply chain system's expected utility on centralized decision and the manufacturer and the retailer's expected utility on decentral- ized decision is relevant to time-inconsistent preference, and the stronger the time-inconsistent preference, the smaller the expected utility.
作者 曹二保 胡畔
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第3期77-83,共7页 Soft Science
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71671061、71420107027) 教育部“新世纪人才支持计划”项目(NCET-13-0181)
关键词 时间偏好不一致 供应链 碳减排 随机双曲折现 动态 time-inconsistent preference supply chain carbon emission reduction Stochastic Hyperbolic Discounting dy-namic
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