价值一体性命题的法哲学批判:以方法论为中心

A Legal Philosophical Critique of Value Unity Thesis: Centering on Methodology

德沃金所捍卫的价值一体性命题主张价值之间的相互融贯和支持,包含着本体论、认识论和方法论上的基本主张。方法论立场是该命题的关键性内容。德沃金主张价值实践是解释性实践,价值理论是解释性的、一阶实质理论。这种方法论立场否定了元伦理学的存在基础,同时给一般法理学带来了严重挑战。然而,元伦理学在方法论上并不会导向怀疑主义,而且能够帮助一般法理学走出方法论上的困境。将一般法理学视为元规范性探究的一部分,即探究法律思想和讨论如何适应于现实实在的说明性事业,可以捍卫一般法理学的二阶方法论立场。一般法理学的元规范性属性可以突破价值一体性命题的挑战,但仍然需要解决一些新的理论难题。

The value unity thesis defended by Dworkin claims that values cohere and support each other. This thesis includes ontological,epistemological and methodologicalbasic arguments.Methodological standpoint is the key content of this thesis. Dworkin claims that value practice is interpretative practice,and value theory is interpretative and first-order substantial theory. This methodological standpoint denies the existence foundation of meta-ethics,and poses serious challenge to general jurisprudence. However,meta-ethics does not fall to skepticism in methodology,and can help general jurisprudence get out of the methodological dilemma. Taking general jurisprudence as metanormative inquiry,namely the explanative enterprise inquiring how legal thought and talk fit reality,can defend the second-order methodological standpoint of general jurisprudence. The meta-normative feature of general jurisprudence is capable of overcoming the challenge of value unity thesis,but still needs to solve new theoretical problems.