中国城市低保瞄准困境:资格障碍、技术难题,还是政治影响?

The Targeting Dilemma of Urban Dibao in China:Eligibility Obstruction,Technological Problem,or Political Influences?

使用收入、生计资产和主观评价三种标准对中国城市低保制度瞄准率进行计算,结果发现瞄准偏误难以避免。瞄准偏误产生原因的主要包括四方面:除了正式文件中规定的资格条件以外,各地在具体瞄准实践过程中还可能夹杂一些不成文的潜规则;现有家计调查方法在技术上很难非常准确地查清家庭收入和财产状况;瞄准精度与行政成本密切相关,而国家用于低保瞄准的行政成本比较有限;低保制度瞄准过程中的自由裁量权很容易被工具性地用来服务于实现政治目标,进而导致瞄准偏误。

This article use income,livelihood assets and subjective evaluation to calculate the targeting error of urban Dibao system in China.The result shows the targeting error cannot remove completely in practice.The reasons of targeting errors produced can be divided into four aspects.There are some unwritten rules on eligibility in the targeting process except official rules on legal policies.The means test could not completely find out the real condition of family income and assets.The accuracy degree of targeting is closely related with administrative cost while the administrative cost cannot be increase unlimitedly.The agency＇s discretion of Dibao system is always used for achieving political goals.When the agency＇s discretion is misused,the targeting error cannot be avoided.