版权蟑螂现象的法律治理——网络版权市场中的利益平衡机制

On the Legal Regulation of Copyright Troll Phenomenon——The balance of Interests Mechanism in the Internet Copyright Market

版权蟑螂现象及其危害引发人们思考版权人、网络服务提供者、网络用户与大众利益之间的关系。版权蟑螂从早期单纯的版权购买者已转向与原版权人捆绑结合,而其针对网络服务提供者的诉讼主张,也转入了针对下载盗版作品的网络用户,使之具有了更强的隐蔽性。透过侵权诉讼获利的行为本身无可厚非,网络盗版用户并不能合理使用规则予以抗辩。但版权蟑螂频繁地利用法定赔偿方式获取巨额利润的做法,表明法定赔偿的异化,并应定位在"基准赔付额度+"层面实现理性回归。但釜底抽薪的做法是采取境外的"三振出局"的积极保护机制,弥补了"避风港"消极原则的不足。我国应该创造性地引入这一机制,以断网处罚为主建立起中国特色的"三色机制",在新的利益平衡中激活一个健康的网络版权市场。

The copyright troll phenomenon and its harmful impacts have induced a new round of thoughts upon the relationship be- tween copyright holders, internet service providers, internet users and general public. While the identity of copyright trolls has transformed from plain buyers of copyright to being bundled with the original right holders, they have also started to bring suits a- gainst regular internet users who illegally download pirated works instead of internet service providers, thus strengthening them- selves with better concealment. Indeed, the conduct of profiteering from infringement litigation is not legally wrongful, since the users of internet piracy cannot rely on the principle of fair use as a ground of defense. The frequent use of statutory damage when pursuing considerable profits by copyright trolls has indicated a hint of dissimilation of the statutory damage regime, and it ought to achieve a recurrence of reason by adopting the principle of ＂base limit of compensation＋＂. But ＇after all, the essentially thor- ough solution is to introduce the positive protection approach of the ＂Three Strikes Policy＇, which should conceivably remedy the passive nature of the rule of ＂Safe Harbor＂. China should give a flexible approach while introducing the said policy, then build a Chinese-characterized ＂Three Colors Mechanism＂ with suspension of internet access being the primary form of deterrence, and e- ventually stimulate a healthy market of internet copyright with a whole new balance of interests.