制造商公平偏好下双渠道闭环供应链定价与协调

Pricing and Coordination of Dual-channel Closed-loop Supply Chain under Manufacturer’s Fairness Preference

将制造商公平偏好行为特征引入双渠道闭环供应链，针对非合作独立决策、完全合作联合决策两种不同情形分别建立相应的定价决策模型．运用博弈理论求得两种不同情形下的最优定价策略，并分析了公平偏好系数对供应链各成员最优定价策略及利润的影响．研究发现：制造商公平偏好行为特征能增强其讨价还价能力，但不利于提升供应链经济效益和社会绿色环保效益；非合作独立决策下的系统利润低于完全合作联合决策下的系统利润．为此，通过联合运用一个由批发价格、直销价格和回收转移价格组成的定价机制和一个两部定价补充协议对双渠道闭环供应链进行协调，可以实现双方的Pareto改进．

Based on the consideration of dual-channel closed-loop supply chain with man- ufacturer＇s fairness preference behavior, the two different pricing models are constructed under non-cooperative independent decision-making and fully-cooperative joint decision-making. The optimal pricing strategies under the two different situations are obtained by using game theory, and the influences of fairness preference coefficient on the optimal pricing decisions and the profits of the supply chain members are analyzed. The results show that the manufacturer＇s fairness preference can enhance his bargaining power while it is unfavorable to the economic benefit of the supply chain and the green environmental protection benefit of the society. The system profit in non-cooperative independent decision-making is less than that in fully-cooperatlve joint decision-making. Thus, a price mechanism with a wholesale price, a di- rect channel price and a transfer price and a two-part tariff complementary agreement are used to coordinate the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain and realized the Pareto improvement for both sides.