从ODN案看美国董事信义义务的新动向

Recognizing the Trend of Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the USA through the ODN Case

以美国特拉华州为代表的公司法律中,法院在对董事决策进行司法审查时,会通过"商业判断规则"等做出有利于董事的推定;仅有当原告满足了较高的举证责任,如证明董事恶意、非独立或攫取了公司的商业机会,案件才有可能进入实质性审理阶段;而董事免责条款的出现使得原告的诉讼变得更为艰难。但若不符合采用商业判断规则的条件,则会导致完全公平规则的引入,对董事相当不利。2017年ODN案判决表明,对优先股超出普通股权利的特殊保护不为信义义务所要求;董事陷入利益冲突时,董事会保护优先股股东的决策可能会失去商业判断规则的保护。

In the judicial review of a director＇s business decision,a US court would make presumptions in favor of the director pursuant to the business judgment rule;in many US states,only when the plaintiff meets his/her high burden of proof,for example,that the director acted in bad faith,or was independent,or seized business opportunities of the corporation,would the case proceed to the stage of discovery and beyond;furthermore,the birth of exculpatory provision for directors made it even harder for the plaintiff to prevail in such a lawsuit.If the presumption of business judgment rule is rebutted,however,it would result in the application of the entire fairness doctrine which is extremely disadvantageous to the director.The ODN decision in 2017 re-affirmed the rule that protecting the privileges of preferred stocks not shared by common stocks is beyond the requirements of directors＇ fiduciary duties; when the interest of preferred and common shareholders are in conflict,directors＇ decision advancing the interest of preferred might risk losing the protection of business judgment rule.