高管薪酬攀比与企业避税

On Executive Pay Bandwagon and Corporate Tax Avoidance

本文以2007~2015年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证检验高管薪酬攀比的心理特征对企业避税行为的影响,研究发现:如果高管薪酬低于同行业可比公司高管薪酬的中位数越多,即高管进行薪酬攀比的动机越大,企业未来避税的程度就越高,且这种效应在国有控股企业中更为显著。避税路径检验结果显示,薪酬攀比会促使高管通过向下应计盈余管理而非向上应计盈余管理的方式影响企业避税,同时也发现高管薪酬攀比通过真实盈余管理影响企业避税的微弱证据。基于避税结果的检验发现,高管薪酬攀比强度越大,高管通过避税获取的在职消费就越多。上述证据表明,薪酬攀比心理是高管实施避税寻租的重要诱因。

Based on a sample of A-share listed companies in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2015,we examine the impact of the psychological traits of executive pay bandwagon on corporate tax avoidance.We find that the lower the executives' compensation is than the median pay level of executives in firms of similar size and industry,the stronger incentive the executives to compare with other executives whose pay is higher,increasing the level of tax avoidance in the future,this effect is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises.Further study also shows that executives with strong comparing mentality tend to use downward earnings management rather than upward earnings management to influence the extent to which it avoids tax in an aggressive manner,and we only find weak evidence that executives avoid more tax via real earnings management due to pay bandwagon.Lastly,we also find that the greater the intensity of executive pay bandwagon,the more significant relationship between the level of tax avoidance and executive perquisites.Collectively,our findings suggest that pay bandwagon is an important inducement of executives' rent-seeking through tax avoidance.