税收波动影响稽查力度了吗?

Does the Fluctuation of Tax Affect the Intensity of Inspection?

长期以来,中国税收征管背后存在典型的政府主导特征。文章独辟蹊径,从省级政府稽查力度的视角分析了税收波动与税务稽查的动态关系,以此求证税收征管如何受政府行为和政府目标的影响。利用中国2001-2013年省级面板数据进行实证回归,结果显示:在税收波动下,为了平滑税收增长轨道,政府往往会反向调整税务稽查力度。当税收增长乏力时,政府将相机加大稽查力度;反之,政府则会减小稽查力度。进一步分析显示:稽查力度的调整是通过扩大稽查范围而非加大处罚力度的方式实现,自由裁量权在我国税务稽查判罚尺度中并未显著存在。该研究有助于深入认识中国税务稽查中的政府行为特征,同时对依法治税建设具有一定的参考价值。

For a long time,there are typical government-dominant features behind the tax collection and administration in China. This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between volatility of tax and tax inspection from the view of provincial government inspection efforts in order to make it clear how government behavior and government target affect tax collection. The empirical regression results of the provincial panel data in 2001-2013 show that,in order to smooth the tax increase,the government tends to adjust the tax inspection in the light of tax fluctuations. When the tax increase is weak,the inspection intensity will increase; otherwise,it will decrease.Further analysis shows that the adjustment of inspection efforts is achieved by expanding the scope of inspection rather than increasing penalties. The discretion does not exist in the scale of tax audit in China. This study is useful for understanding the behavior of Chinese government behind tax inspection,and has a certain reference value for the future construction of tax law.