基于演化博弈的光伏产业支持政策研究

Research on Incentive Policy of Photovoltaic Industry based on Evolutionary Game Theory

光伏产业作为战略性新兴产业,具有优化能源结构、调节产业经济、促进节能减排的作用,对我国实现低碳经济建设具有重要的现实和战略意义。针对我国光伏企业支持政策的优化问题,文章构建了以政府和光伏发电企业为博弈主体的演化博弈模型,并引入学习曲线方法,分析技术变化对博弈双方均衡策略的影响。结果表明:政府决策的关键在于比较制定不同补贴政策所能获得的经济与环境效益,而光伏企业决策的聚焦点则是选择不同效率光伏发电技术的经济收益。不同技术成本差异小于某一特定值时,高效率技术淘汰低效率技术。引入技术变化影响后,上述临界值的大小和政府的补贴力度相关,政府较高的补贴力度和补贴差异可以促进先进光伏发电技术更早地进入市场,提升光伏产业在发电市场的竞争力。

As a strategic emerging industry,solar photovoltaic industry has the advantages of optimizing energy structure,regulating industrial economy and promoting energy conservation and emission reduction.It has important practical and strategic significance for the realization of low carbon economy construction in china.In order to optimize the supporting policy of photovoltaic industry in China,this paper established an evolutionary game model with government and PV enterprises as game players.Also,the learning curve was introduced to analyze the impact on making strategic decisions of both parties.The results show that the key of government decision-making lies in comparing the economic and environmental benefits of the high-subsidy and low-subsidy policies,and the photovoltaic enterprises focus on comparing the economic benefits obtained from the production with high efficiency and low efficiency.After introducing the learning curve,the critical value of the technical difference cost threshold is related to the government subsidies for PV enterprises.With the relatively high subsidies and subsidy differences,the government can promote the entry of advanced technologies into the market earlier and promote the PV industry to achieve market competition.