需求扰动和产能限制下单向替代产品定价研究

Pricing for One-Way Alternative Product Based on Demand Disturbance and Production Capacity Constraints

本文基于信息对称和产品单向替代,考虑一个具有产能限制的制造商和一个零售商的定价问题,以及市场需求具有随机扰动性,建立了以制造商为主导零售商追随的Stackelberg单周期博弈模型,确定两种产品的最优批发价格和零售价格。理论分析表明,产能的提高使制造商和零售商的最优价格降低;两种产品发生替代的概率和服务水平仅与需求的随机扰动项服从的分布有关。通过数值分析验证模型的合理性,发现产品替代程度和产能的提高有利于供应链成员和系统利润的增加,当制造商不受产能限制时,各决策变量和供应链利润水平不再受产能变化的影响。

Based on information symmetry and one-way substitution of products, considering the pricing of a manufacturerwith capacity constraints and a retailer, and the stochastic perturbation of the market demand, this paper established a Stackelbergsingle-period Game to decide the optimal wholesale prices and sale prices, in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retaileris the follower. Theoretical analysis indicated that the more the production capacity is, the lower the optimal price of the manufacturer and the retailer are. The probability of the substitution of products and the level of service were merely related to the distribution of the stochastic perturbation term of demand. The rationality of model was verified by numerical analysis. It was found thatsupply chain members and system profits increased with the degree of product substitution and production capacity. And when themanufacturer is not limited by production capacity, the decision variables and the profit levels were no longer influenced by thechange of production capacity.