摘要
本文分析了以政府为主导的循环经济运营模式,使用Stackelberg主从博弈的方法,求得了主方政府和从方企业的最优效用。发现提高产品的标准化程度、明确信息沟通和政策透明性、规范各类奖惩补贴制度,实现以税代奖、以税代补的模式,有助于政府明确自身定位,更好的主导我国循环经济的发展。
This paper analyzes the operation mode of circular economy, which is dominated by the goverment, and uses themethod of Stackelberg master-slave game, and obtains the optimal utility of the dominant goverment and the enterprise. It finds thatto improve the standardization of products, clarify informatio communication and standardize the system of rewards and punishments, to implement the model of replacing the reward and subsidies with taxes, it will help the goverment to define itself and leadthe development of circular economy in China.
出处
《工业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期156-160,共5页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金
辽宁省社会科学规划基金"辽宁循环经济试验区建设研究--基于能值分析的理论框架"(项目编号:L11CJL038)