政府竞争水平差异有利于提升企业跨地区并购绩效吗?

Does the Difference of Government Competition Level Help to Improve the Performance of Cross Regional M&A?

地方政府竞争水平的差异化特征,为企业通过跨地区并购所形成的资本跨区域布局提供了"制度套利"机会和"资源协同"空间。基于2007—2013年我国A股上市公司的非关联跨地区并购数据,理论分析并实证检验了政府竞争水平差异影响企业跨地区并购绩效的具体效应及逻辑路径。研究发现:政府竞争水平差异显著提升了企业跨地区并购绩效,主并企业所得税税负的下降、财政补助收入的增加在政府竞争水平差异与并购绩效的关系中具有部分中介作用。因此,中央政府应进一步扩大和优化地方政府在税收竞争及财政支出竞争方面的自主权,而主并企业应重视并购中的税务协同和价值链协同效应。

The difference of local government competition level provides the ＂institutional arbitrage＂opportunities and ＂resource synergy＂space for enterprises of cross regional MA. Based on the non-related MA transaction data of A—share listed firms in China from 2007—2013,this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the effect of the difference of government competition on the performance of cross regional MA,and the mediation effect of the tax burden and financial subsidy income of enterprises. The study found that： the difference of government competition improves the performance of cross regional MA. In addition,the tax burden and the financial subsidy income of enterprises have partial mediation effect on the relationship between the difference of government competition and performance of cross regional MA. Therefore,the central government should further expand and optimize the autonomy of the local government in terms of tax competition and fiscal expenditure competition,and the enterprises of cross regional MA should pay attention to both tax coordination and regional industry synergies.