担保类表外融资:被忽视的影子银行

Guaranteed Off-Balance-Sheet Financing: Neglected Shadow Bank

"担保类表外融资"是中国影子银行的重要组成部分。本文通过构建数据集,研究担保类表外融资周期波动的内在机制。研究发现:首先,与发达国家不同,中国商业银行的担保类表外融资业务与普通贷款存在稳定的替代关系。任何影响银行信贷的冲击,都会间接对担保类表外融资产生作用相反的影响。其次,合意贷款政策间接造成了担保类表外融资业务的超常增长,而非"存准率"、"贷存比"等传统监管约束。最后,担保类表外融资业务还受经济波动、业务风险与收益、银行经营水平和市场信用度等因素的影响。

Guaranteed off-balance-sheet activity （consists of banker＇s acceptance, letter of credit and letter of guar- antee）, is an essential part of China＇s shadow banking, but neglected by current research because no data available. This paper fills the research gap by investigating the mechanism behinds its cyclical behavior, through a city-level data- set. Different from developed economies, the paper finds that in China, guaranteed off-balance-sheet has a long-run substitute relation with commercial loan. Therefore, any policy impacts on commercial loan growth will have a con- verse effect on guaranteed off-balance-sheet growth indirectly. Furthermore, contrary to existing research about China＇s shadow banking, the paper finds the Consensus Loan Policy conducted by the People＇s Bank of China during 2011- 2014 is the unique fundamental driving force, rather than traditional regulatory constraints such as reserve requirement ratio and loan-to-deposit ratio. It＇s an example of macro-prudential policy induces shadow banking activity. Moreover, guaranteed off-balance-sheet growth is also influenced by macro-economy condition, risk and return factors of itself, operation efficiency and credit worthiness of the bank. Hence, empirical results of this paper could also be viewed as the first time to test off-balance-sheet development theories with China＇s data.