内外部监督机制对上市公司财务欺诈有约束力吗?

Can Internal and External Supervision Mechanisms Reduce the Likelihood of Financial Fraud of Listed Companies?

选取2007—2015年因发生财务欺诈被监管单位处罚的上市公司为样本,对我国市场监督机制对上市公司财务欺诈约束的有效性进行研究,并深入检验各项机制对不同类型财务欺诈行为的约束是否存在差异。结果表明,国内现有的监督机制对上市公司财务欺诈行为的约束并非全部有效,只有外部审计师能够有效约束两类欺诈行为,大股东治理对两类财务欺诈行为均无显著效果,其他机制只对其中一种欺诈行为有约束作用。

From 2007—2015 listed companies punished by regulators due to financial frauds as a sample,we research on the effectiveness of Chinese existing market supervision mechanisms on the constraints of listed company＇s financial frauds.Furthermore,whether the mechanisms have differences between the different types of financial frauds is tested. The results indicate that not all the existing supervision mechanisms in China is valid; only the external auditor can effectively restrain two types of fraud; large shareholder governance had no significant effect on both; other only had effect on one of the two types of fraud.