摘要
本文从非合作博弈角度研究了中央政府PM2.5减排指标机制.首先根据各地区之间雾霾跨界传输贡献矩阵计算了地区PM2.5减排能力;接着计算了各地区的PM2.5治理成本;然后研究了不同治霾指标下各地区的非合作治霾策略选择;最后根据各地区的减排能力和治霾策略,研究中央政府如何确定PM2.5减排指标促使各地区最大化减排PM2.5.本文以京津冀为例进行实证研究,并以2015年为基期,探究京津冀地区在2020年、2030年的PM2.5减排指标的设置以促使各区域在非合作博弈下最大化去除PM2.5.
This paper studied the mechanism of the PM2.5 emission reduction index of the central govern- ment from the perspective of non-cooperative game. First, according to the contribution matrix of haze transmission across regions, the PM2.5 reduction capacity was calculated. Later, the PM2.5 governance costs in various regions was calculated. Then, the non-cooperative haze governance strategy in different regions under different haze indicators was studied. Finally, according to the abatement capacity of all regions and the haze control strategy, how the central government determines PM2.5 emission reduction targets to maximize the emission reduction of PM2.5 in all regions was studied. Based on 2015, this paper took the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei as an example to explore the setting of PM2.5 emission reduction index in 2020 and 2030 so as to promote the removal of PM2.5 in all regions under the non-cooperative game.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第3期710-718,共9页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
北京市教委社科计划面上项目(0142132014)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(17YJC630203)
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71532002)
首都师范大学科技交叉项目~~
关键词
PM2.5减排指标
非合作博弈
治霾策略
机制设计
PM2.5 emission reduction index
non-cooperative game
haze control strategy
mechanismdesign